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JULIE A. H OPKINS *

GOOGLE®: Not your Generic Search Engine

“Google it.” Everyone says it. But what is meant by the phrase? When asking someone
where to find facts or information online, you will likely be told to “google it.” The
term “Google” has entered the vocabulary as a verb, not just a brand name.1 The
internet search engine has become shorthand for conducting an online search for
information.2 At the same time, the trademark, GOOGLE®, is one of the most valuable
and recognizable brands in the world and is strongly associated with the goods and
services offered under the mark.3 Can a famous brand remain protectable as a
trademark if it is often used as a verb for the very service provided under the
trademark? That was the question asked by Chris Gillespie and David Elliott,
individuals who sought to register over 750 domain names that included the term,
“Google.”4

©2018 Julie A. Hopkins
* Julie A. Hopkins holds a B.A. from Smith College and a J.D. from the University of Maryland Carey School
of Law, where she is an adjunct professor teaching Trademarks and Unfair Competition Law. At Hopkins IP,
LLC, the author protects and enforces brands as an intellectual property attorney, focusing her practice on
trademark and copyright law. The author would like to thank Matthew Palmer and Robert Hopkins for their
continued love and support. The author further thanks the editors and staff of the Journal of Business and
Technology Law for inviting her to write on this current and interesting topic. This article is dedicated to the
author’s mother, Sharon Hopkins, in memoriam.
1. See, e.g., Google, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ google
(defining the transitive verb as follows: “to use the Google search engine to obtain information about (someone
or something) on the World Wide Web.”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
2. Id.
3. Google v. Gillespie, Nat’l Arb. F., Claim No. FA1203001434643 (May 10, 2012), http://www.
adrforum.com/domaindecisions/1434643.htm; see also BRAND FINANCE, GLOBAL 500 2017: THE ANNUAL REPORT
ON THE WORLD’S MOST VALUABLE BRANDS (2017) (listing Google as the most valuable brand of 2017),
http://brandfinance.com/images/upload/global_500_2017_locked_website.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
4. Google v. Gillespie, Nat’l Arb. F., Claim No. FA1203001434643 (May 10, 2012), http://www.adr
forum.com/domaindecisions/1434643.htm.
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GOOGLE®: NOT YOUR GENERIC SEARCH ENGINE
I. DISTINCTIVE TRADEMARKS AND GENERICIDE

In order for a trademark to be protectable, and thus enforceable as a trademark
against infringers, the mark must be distinctive.5 A trademark is distinctive if it serves
as a source identifier for a good or service.6 In trademark law, there is a spectrum of
terms from least distinctive to most distinctive, categorized as (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.7 At one end of the spectrum,
generic terms are common names which identify the type of good or service.8 Generic
terms are not capable of serving as source identifiers and are not registerable or
enforceable as trademarks. Arbitrary and fanciful marks are strong trademarks and
are inherently distinctive.9 They are automatically entitled to protection and serve to
identify the source of a product or service.10 An example of an arbitrary mark is
APPLE® for computers. The term APPLE® is not being used with fruit or a fruit-based
business, but is instead, being used with unrelated goods.11 Fanciful trademarks are
made-up terms such as EXXON® and KODAK®.12 The trademarks at issue, GOOGLE®
for computer hardware, computer software, and computer services,13 are fanciful
marks and are afforded strong protections.14
Even though strong distinctive marks are afforded the greatest protection in
trademark law, they are also susceptible to falling victim to genericide.15 Genericide
occurs when the public appropriates a trademark and uses it as a generic name for a
particular type of good or service irrespective of its source.16 Examples include
5.

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
Id. at § 1127.
7. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1127.
8. Hunting World, 537 F.2d at 9.
9. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768 (citing Hunting World, 537 F.2d at 9).
10. Id.
11. MARK A. GLICK ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES: GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS 257 (2002).
12. Expert Report of Robert T. Scherer at 32, J.T. Colby & Co., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-cv-04060-DLC
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2012).
13. GOOGLE, Registration No. 2,884,502 (discussing “computer hardware; computer software for creating
indexes of information, indexes of web sites and indexes of other information resources”); GOOGLE,
Registration No. 2,806,075 (discussing “computer services, namely, providing software interfaces available over
a network in order to create a personalized on-line information service; extraction and retrieval of information
and data mining by means of global computer networks; creating indexes of information, indexes of web sites
and indexes of other information sources in connection with global computer networks; providing information
from searchable indexes and databases of information, including text, electronic documents, databases, graphics
and audio visual information, by means of global computer information networks”).
14. Expert Report of Robert T. Scherer at 36, J.T. Colby & Co., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-cv-04060-DLC
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2012) (“Fanciful marks consist of those marks which are made up or invented words, such as
EXXON, KODAK and GOOGLE . . . .”).
15. Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
16. Id. at 1156.
6.

172

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Hopkins_Page_Proof_Final (Do Not Delete)

5/1/2018 4:16 PM

JULIE A. HOPKINS
ASPIRIN, CELLOPHANE, and ESCALATOR, three terms that were once
protectable as arbitrary or fanciful trademarks, but now are primarily understood by
the public to be generic names for those same goods.17 A registered U.S. trademark
is subject to cancellation if it becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or
a portion thereof, for which it is registered.18
When Google, Inc. (“Google”) challenged the registration of Gillespie and
Elliott’s domain names containing GOOGLE®, Gillespie and Elliott countered that
GOOGLE® no longer served as a source identifier and had fallen victim to
genericide.19 Relying on evidence that “google” is overwhelmingly being used as verb
for internet searching, Elliott and Gillespie fought for the cancellation of the
GOOGLE® trademarks before the National Arbitration Forum and in the federal
courts.20 Their battle ended at the U.S. Supreme Court when their Petition for Writ
of Certiorari was denied and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision
that GOOGLE® is not generic was upheld.21
II. G OOGLE S UCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED THE R EGISTRATION OF D OMAIN N AMES
C ONTAINING “G OOGLE ”

Google discovered that Chris Gillespie registered 763 domain names between
February and March 2012 that contained the GOOGLE® trademark followed by
another famous brand or the name of a well-known individual.22 Examples of the
domain names registered include googledisney.com, googlebarackobama.net, and
googlemexicocity.com.23 The company immediately filed a Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy complaint requesting a decision by a three-member panel
appointed by the National Arbitration Forum that the domain names be transferred
to Google.24
Google argued (i) that it rightfully owned the GOOGLE® trademarks, (ii) that
the domain names registered by Gillespie contained the GOOGLE® trademark in its
entirety, (iii) Gillespie was seeking to sell the domain names or otherwise gain
revenue through pay-per-click advertising and third party advertising links, and (iv)
Gillespie filed for a large number of domain name registrations in a short amount of

17.

Id.
Elliot v. Google, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012)).
19. Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1161.
20. Id.
21. Elliot v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
22. Google v. Gillespie, Nat’l Arb. F., Claim No. FA1203001434643 (May 10, 2012), http://www.adrforum.
com/domaindecisions/1434643.htm.
23. Elliot v. Google, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1159 (D. Ariz. 2014).
24. Google v. Gillespie, Nat’l Arb. F., Claim No. FA1203001434643 (May 10, 2012), http://www.adrforum.
com/domaindecisions/1434643.htm.
18.
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GOOGLE®: NOT YOUR GENERIC SEARCH ENGINE
time.25 This evidence supported a finding that Gillespie acted in bad faith registering
and using the domain names, Google concluded.26 Therefore, Google argued, the
domain names should be transferred to it.27
In response, Gillespie explained that he legitimately obtained the domain
names with the intent of developing a business model of affinity-based social
networks providing content, products, and services distinct from Google.28 He also
stated that he did not register the domain names in the hope of attracting internet
users who are seeking to avail themselves of Google’s search engine services and that
users will discover his websites when they use the term, “google” as a generic verb to
search for a topic, brand, or person.29
The UDRP panel ruled in favor of Google and ordered the domain names be
transferred to Google because they are confusingly similar to the GOOGLE® mark,
Gillespie had no right or legitimate interests in the domain names, and the domain
names were registered and used in bad faith.30
A. District Court Held GOOGLE® Not Generic
In response to the loss before the UDRP panel, Gillespie, along with Chris Elliott,
filed a complaint seeking cancellation of the GOOGLE® trademarks and a declaration
that the marks are generic with the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.31
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue
of whether the GOOGLE® trademarks at issue are generic.32
Senior District Judge, Stephen M. McNamee, wrote the opinion holding that
GOOGLE® is not a generic term and therefore, the GOOGLE® trademarks at issue are
not subject to cancellation.33 The Court stated that the test for determining whether
a registered trademark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in
connection with which it has been used, is the “primary significance test.”34 “A mark
is not generic when the primary significance of the term in the minds of the

25.

Id.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Google v. Gillespie, Nat’l Arb. F., Claim No. FA1203001434643 (May 10, 2012), http://www.adrforum.
com/domaindecisions/1434643.htm.
31. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1160 (D. Ariz. 2014). The Defendants filed counterclaims for
trademark dilution, cybersquatting, and unjust enrichment under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition and
false advertising under California state law. Id.
32. Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1160.
33. Id. at 1175.
34. Id. at 1161.
26.
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consuming public is not the product but the producer.”35 In contrast, “if the primary
significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the
producer, the trademark is a generic term and cannot be a valid trademark.”36 The
Court, therefore, determined that “the relevant issue is whether the primary
significance of the GOOGLE® marks to a majority of the public who performs
searches on the internet understands that the mark refers to the Google search engine
as opposed to a descriptive term for search engines in general.”37
Before the Court evaluated the evidence to determine the primary significance
of GOOGLE®, the Court discussed Plaintiffs’ main argument, that “a trademark
ceases to function when it is used primarily as a verb.”38 The Court stated that this
premise is flawed, and that a term functions as a trademark if it distinguishes a
product or service from those of others and indicate the product’s or service’s
source.39 Verb usage of a trademark can still identify a producer or denote source, the
Court noted.40 The Court discussed discriminate verb use and indiscriminate verb
use and distinguished the two through an example.41 Discriminate verb use of, “I will
PHOTOSHOP the image” means the act of manipulating an image by using the
trademarked PHOTOSHOP® graphics software sold by Adobe Systems.42
Indiscriminate verb use of, “I will PHOTOSHOP the image” could also mean image
manipulation by using graphics editing software in general, referring to the category
of activity.43 The Court clarified that indiscriminate verb usage of a mark does not
perform exclusively as a trademark; rather it describes both the species of activity
(Adobe’s PHOTOSHOP® brand software) and the genus of the activity (using image
manipulation software in general.)44
The Court went on to say that a mark is not rendered generic merely because
the mark serves this “dual function” of identifying the species of service at the same
time indicating the genus of services in which the species belongs.45 Nor, the Court
said, is a mark generic “merely because it has some significance to the public as an
indication of the genus of the activity.”46 In order for a mark to become generic, the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1164.
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2014).
Id. at 1161–62.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2014).
Id.
Id.
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GOOGLE®: NOT YOUR GENERIC SEARCH ENGINE
Court stated, “the principal significance of the word must be of the nature or class of
an article, rather than an indication of its origin.”47
In determining the primary significance of the GOOGLE® marks to the
consuming public, the Court first recognized the strong presumption of validity
afforded to the GOOGLE® trademarks, since they are registered with the U.S.
Trademark Office.48 This presumption includes the specific presumption that the
marks are not generic.49
Next, the Court turned to the evidence provided including dictionary usage,
mark-holder usage, competitor usage, media usage, expert opinions, and consumer
surveys.50 Regarding the dictionary definitions of “google,” all of the definitions
submitted to the Court included use of “google” as a verb and the trademark
significance of the term.51 This evidence, the Court held, established that “google”
carries meaning as an indiscriminate verb.52
Evidence that Google’s co-founder, Larry Page once stated, “have fun and keep
googling” was offered by Plaintiffs to support that Google uses the term as a verb,
and they made several arguments that Google does not enforce its trademark rights
in the GOOGLE® mark.53 The Court disregarded these arguments as unreasonable.54
The Court further looked at how competitors describe their products or services.55 If
short, simple descriptive terms exist for the genus of the trademarked species, this
supports that the mark at issue is not generic.56 The term “internet search engine”
was determined to be short and simple supporting Google’s position.57 There was no
evidence that Google’s competitors use the GOOGLE® mark in a non-trademark
way.58 Evidence, did, however, support that the media sometimes uses GOOGLE® as
a verb to mean searching the internet.59
The Court then turned to the offered survey evidence which established that
51% of people understand that “google” is used as a verb as the indiscriminate act of

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1170.
Id.
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1170 (D. Ariz. 2014).
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1172.
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1172 (D. Ariz. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1173.
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searching on the internet and over 90% of the consuming public understand
GOOGLE® to be a particular brand.60
The Court opined that for the cancellation claim to survive summary judgment,
Plaintiffs needed to submit probative evidence that the primary significance of the
term, “google” to the majority of the consuming public was a common descriptive
term for search engines.61 But, Plaintiffs failed to do so, instead, presenting evidence
about whether the majority of the consuming public understood the term, “google”
to be a verb, killing their claim for genericide.62 Rather, the Court held that the
evidence supported that the consuming public “overwhelmingly understands the
word, ‘google’ to identify a particular search engine, not to describe search engines
in general.”63 The Court, therefore, determined that Google was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, and that the GOOGLE® trademarks were not generic.64
B. Ninth Circuit Upheld District Court Decision
Dissatisfied with the District Court’s decision, Elliott and Gillespie appealed the
ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.65 Plaintiffs raised
two arguments on appeal: (1) that the district court misapplied the primary
significance test and failed to recognize the importance of verb use, and (2) that the
district court impermissibly weighed the evidence when it granted summary
judgment for Google.66 Judge Richard Tallman wrote for the majority affirming
summary judgment for Google.67
The opinion began with the Court reiterating the “primary significance test” or,
as the Ninth Circuit calls it, “the who-are-you/what-are-you” test.68
If the relevant public primarily understands a mark as describing the “who”
a particular good or service is, or where it comes from, then the mark is still
valid. But if the relevant public primarily understands a mark as describing
the “what” the particular good or service is, then the mark has become
generic.69

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1173–74.
Id. at 1174.
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1174 (D. Ariz. 2014).
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1175.
Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1156.
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Preliminarily, Plaintiffs argued that the question presented by the district court
should have been whether the relevant public primarily uses the word, “google” as a
verb.70 The Court concluded that this inquiry was flawed because the claim of
genericide must always relate to a particular type of good or service and second, the
question assumes that verb use automatically constitutes generic use, which it does
not.71 Plaintiffs claim that “google” has become generic for the “act” of searching the
internet and posits that the district court erred when it looked at internet search
engines.72 After looking at the language of the Lanham Act and the protectability of
arbitrary marks, the Court concluded that a claim of genericide must relate to a
particular type of good or service, not an act.73
Next, the Court considered Plaintiffs’ claim that a word can only be used in a
trademark sense when it is used as an adjective.74 Looking to Coca-Cola Company v.
Overland, Incorporated,75 the Court emphasized that they already rejected the theory
that only adjective use constitutes trademark use.76 In Coca-Cola Company, the Court
noted that the mere fact that customers ordered “a coke,” using the mark as a noun,
failed to show what consumers were thinking, or whether they had a specific source
in mind.77 Using the terms coined by the district court, the Court acknowledged that
a customer might use the noun “coke” in an “indiscriminate sense,” with no
particular soda in mind; or in a “discriminate sense,” with COCA-COLA® the brand
in mind.78 As such, the Court recognized that in the same way, an internet user might
use the verb, “google” in an indiscriminate sense with no particular search engine in
mind; or in a discriminate sense with GOOGLE® the brand in mind.79 The Court
concluded by stating that because a claim of genericide must relate to particular good
or service and because verb use does not necessarily constitute generic use, the
district court properly framed its inquiry “as whether the primary significance of the
word, ‘google’ to the relevant public is as a generic name for internet search engines
or as a mark identifying the Google search engine” specifically.80
The Court then turned to the Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court
impermissibly weighed the evidence considering the “sheer quantity” of evidence

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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Id. at 1155.
Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id.
692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982).
Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
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produced to support their claim for genericide.81 The Court looked at the evidence
provided and determined that it failed to support the primary significance test
because it did not relate to a particular type of good or service, as required.82 Plaintiffs
needed to submit evidence that supported a jury finding that the primary significance
of the word, “google” to the relevant public is a name for internet search engines
generally and not as a mark identifying the GOOGLE® search engine in particular.83
Instead, their evidence only supported the inference that the majority of the public
uses the verb “google” in a generic sense.84 Alone, this evidence is insufficient to
support a finding of genericide.85 The Court reviewed the survey evidence, use of
“google” as a verb by rap artist T-Pain and other consumers and media, the dictionary
definitions discussed above, use by Larry Page, the founder of Google, as discussed
above, and use of alternative words for GOOGLE® as previously mentioned.86 The
Court concluded that this evidence was mostly irrelevant and agreed with the district
court that at best, Plaintiffs presented admissible evidence to support the inference
that a majority of the relevant public uses the verb ‘google in a generic sense.87 But,
since that fact alone does not support a claim for genericide, summary judgment was
properly granted for Google.88
C. Writ of Certiorari Denied; Ninth Circuit Decision that GOOGLE® Not Generic
Stands
In the face of defeat, Gillespie and Elliott continued the fight. On August 14, 2017,
they petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.89 The Petition focused on
three questions. First, does verb use of a trademark, such as “google,” constitute
generic use as a matter of law?90 Second, is the test for primary significance one of
majority usage or majority understanding, as the Ninth Circuit found?91 And, third,
is the district court allowed or required to weigh evidence on a motion for summary

81.

Id.
Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1159–60.
86. Id. at 1161–62.
87. Id. at 1162.
88. Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 2017) (Watford, J., concurring) (agreeing with the
holding of the majority but declining to foreclose the possibility that evidence of indiscriminate verb use could
be relevant in deciding whether a trademark has become generic).
89. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Elliott v. Google, 138 S.Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-258).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 12.
82.
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judgment and did it err when it weighed and discounted all of the evidence of
genericness presented?92
Starting with a policy argument, Petitioners argued that the Court should opine
on verb usage of trademarks because, without discussion, “it leaves trademark
owners, competitors, and the public in the dark as to the ramifications.”93 Petitioners
went on to argue that the district court’s use and the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of verb
usage as “discriminate” or “indiscriminate” was illogical and contradicted trademark
law.94 Petitioners quoted the International Trademark Association (“INTA”)
advising that “trademarks are proper adjectives used to identify the source of the
goods or services noun that they describe” and that “trademarks should not be used
as verbs.”95 Plaintiffs went onto say that the Ninth Circuit holding “open[s] the door
for the registration of verbs as trademarks.”96 But, even more problematic, they
stated, is the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “verb usage, even indiscriminate verb usage,
of a trademark is completely irrelevant to whether a trademark is generic.”97
Petitioners feared that this holding is dangerous and told the Court so.98 Trademark
owners, they stated, follow advice of experts and INTA, and expend large sums of
money to police verb usage of their marks.99 If verb usage is completely irrelevant to
genericness, they claimed, then trademark owners can stop policing verb usage of
their marks.100 Trademark owners, therefore, are left with uncertainty and the Court
should resolve this, Petitioners urged.101
Next, Petitioners argued that the Ninth Circuit set forth a new test under the
“primary significance test.”102 Petitioners cited McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition interpreting the primary significance test as the rule of “majority
usage.”103 The district court assumed that a majority of the public uses the verb,
“google“ in a generic and indiscriminate sense.104 It went on to conclude that this fact

92.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 8–9.
95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Elliott v. Google, 138 S.Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-258) (quoting Proper
Trademark Use Presentation, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N 17 (2015), http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/
Documents/INTAProperUsePresentation.pptx).
96. Id. at 10.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Elliott v. Google, 138 S.Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-258).
102. Id. at 12 (“Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case, the primary significance test from § 1064(3)
had been interpreted as the rule of ‘majority usage.’” (citing 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:6 (4th ed. 1996)).
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 13.
93.
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on its own cannot support a jury finding of genericide under the primary significance
test.105 The Ninth Circuit agreed and in doing so, Petitioners suggested, rejected the
majority usage test in favor of a new test: “how the public primarily understands the
word itself, irrespective of its grammatical function, with regard to internet search
engines.”106 Given the difficulty in understanding what is in the minds of the public,
this test makes it hard to prove genericness and expands the monopoly awarded to
trademark owners, Petitioners argued.107
Lastly, Petitioners asked the Court to clarify whether weighing evidence is
necessary on a motion for summary judgment and specifically, whether the district
court erred when it weighed and discounted the evidence of genericness presented
by Petitioners.108
Google elected not to respond to the Petition and on September 14, 2017, filed
a Waiver of Right to Respond.109 On October 16, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied the Petition.110 By refusing to hear the appeal, the decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals is the final say and the challenged GOOGLE® trademarks remain
enforceable.111
III. THE FUTURE OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR GOOGLE ® AND
OTHER WELL-KNOWN BRANDS

With the Supreme Court denying the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the decision
by the Ninth Circuit stands.112 So long as the primary significance in minds of the
consuming public is that GOOGLE® is a brand, GOOGLE® is not generic, no matter
how many times we instruct others to “google it.” But, the determination of whether
a trademark has become generic can be revisited. It is highly likely that Google will
face future challenges to its mark, especially if GOOGLE® continues to be more and
more ubiquitous as the go-to internet search engine.
To avoid being a victim of its own success, Google will need to continue its
efforts to avoid genericism. In the future, we could see a catchy video like the one
produced by Velcro Companies, the markers of VELCRO®, encouraging consumers

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 13.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Elliott v. Google, 138 S.Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-258).
Id. at 15–16.
Waiver of Right of Respondent Google, Inc. to Respond, Elliott v. Google, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-

109.
258).
110. Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (mem.).
111. See id.
112. See id. (deciding that “Google” was not victim of genericide because it is primarily understood to refer
to the corporation rather than search engines themselves, the decision leaves open the possibility for future
challenges if the primary understanding of “Google” did change in that way).
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GOOGLE®: NOT YOUR GENERIC SEARCH ENGINE
to call non-VELCRO® fasteners a “hook-and-loop,”113 made by Google, convincing
us to “internet search it.”
Indeed, early on, Google recognized the need to take steps to protect its mark
from genericism.114 Efforts included discouraging publications from using the term
“googling” in reference to internet searching, and sending cease and desist letters to
offenders.115 These efforts along with Google’s own trademark use guidelines,116
ultimately resulted in the Oxford English Dictionary and the Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary differentiating the noun and company name, “Google,” and
the verb, “to google,” through use of lowercase letters for the act of searching for
information on the internet, and the use of a capital “G” for the noun and the
company, Google, in their definitions.117 In fact, Google specifically asked
Wordspy.com to modify its definition of “google” to read, “[t]o search for
information on the Web, particularly by using the Google search engine.”118 The
publisher of Merriam-Webster even stated that they crafted a definition that tried to
be respectful of Google’s trademark.119 The importance of these dictionary
definitions cannot be overstated. Both were cited in the District Court opinion and
the Ninth Circuit opinion, swaying the judges in Google’s favor that the marks are
not generic.120

113. Velcro Brand, Don’t Say Velcro, YOUTUBE (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rRi8LptvFZY (“Our Velcro Brand Companies legal team decided to clear a few things up about using
the VELCRO® trademark correctly – because they’re lawyers and that’s what they do. When you use ‘velcro’ as a
noun or a verb (e.g., velcro shoes), you diminish the importance of our brand and our lawyers lose their *insert
fastening sound.* So please, do not say ‘velcro shoes’ (or ‘velcro wallet’ or ‘velcro gloves’) - we repeat ‘velcro’ is
not a noun or a verb. VELCRO® is our brand. #dontsayvelcro.”).
114. See, e.g., Do You “Google?”, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 25, 2006), https://googleblog.blog
spot.com/2006/10/do-you-google.html (“While we’re pleased that so many people think of us when they think of
searching the web, let’s face it, we do have a brand to protect, so we’d like to make clear that you should please
only use “Google” when you’re actually referring to Google Inc. and our services.”).
115. See Jeffrey Kobulnick & Joseph Rothberg, Court Finds ‘Google’ is Not Generic, IPWATCHDOG (May 20,
2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/20/court-finds-google-not-generic/id=83476/.
116. GOOGLE - RULES FOR PROPER USAGE, https://www.google.com/permissions/trademark/rules. html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2018).
117. Jeffrey Kobulnick & Joseph Rothberg, Court Finds ‘Google’ is Not Generic, IPWATCHDOG (May 20, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/20/court-finds-google-not-generic/id=83476/.
118. Elliott v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1171 (D. Az. 2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.; Elliott v. Google, 860 F.3d 1151, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2017) (“At most, with respect to evidence that the
public employs the verb ‘google’ without regard to the search engine used, the plaintiffs have mustered secondary
definitions from a few dictionaries and expert testimony from their linguists. Whatever this evidence might
suggest about the use of ‘google’ as a verb, no rational jury could rely on it to find, on this record, that the word
has become the generic name for Internet search engines. As already mentioned, these dictionaries’ primary
definitions of the word uniformly refer to Google’s own search engine. And the expert linguists conceded in their
depositions that, despite their opinion that ‘google’ is used in verb form without regard to a specific search engine,
the term has not become a generic name for search engines.”).
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JULIE A. HOPKINS
The need for continued policing of the public’s use of famous trademarks is
imperative for a brand to maintain its distinctiveness and enforceability as a
trademark. The Elliott v. Google decision is instructive for other famous brand
owners who experience widespread use of marks by the public, including the need to
be proactive in monitoring domain name registrations, use by consumers and the
media, and dictionary definitions and the importance of providing detailed
trademark usage guides.121 Further, the decision serves as supportive precedent for
successful brands whose marks are facing genericism challenges.122
In a quote provided to The Recorder by Richard Wirtz, lawyer for Petitioners,
Wirtz stated that he believes Congress needs to address the issue of “trademark
verbing.”123 “While the Ninth Circuit landmark decision is now the single authority
addressing the verbing of trademarks in the U.S.,” Wirtz said, “we don’t believe it is
the end of the ‘verbing of trademark’ legal issue . . . we don’t see how any owner of a
trademark can intelligently police verb usages, which will most likely result in further
challenges to verb-ed trademarks.”124 We shall see. Or, we can always “google it.”

121. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Elliott v. Google, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-258), 2017 WL
3601395 (“This holding is dangerous. Trademark owners, following the conventional wisdom and advice of
experts like INTA, have expended large sums of money to police the verb usage of their marks. For example,
Xerox has waged an advertising campaign to ask the public not to use XEROX as a verb because it could lead to
genericide. However, if verb usage is completely irrelevant to genericness, then trademark owners can cease
policing verb usage of their marks.”); see also Elliott v. Google Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“Genericide occurs when the public appropriates a trademark and uses it as a generic name for particular types
of goods or services irrespective of its source. For example, ASPIRIN, CELLOPHANE, and ESCALATOR were
once protectable as arbitrary or fanciful marks because they were primarily understood as identifying the source
of certain goods. But the public appropriated those marks and now primarily understands aspirin, cellophane,
and escalator as generic names for those same goods.”).
122. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Elliott v. Google, 138 S. Ct. 362 (2017) (No. 17-258), 2017 WL
3601395 (suggesting that brands can cease policing verb usage of their trademarks to the extent that people
understand the word, in its common usage, to reference the brand rather than the category of product produced,
even if the word shares some usage as a verb).
123. Ross Todd, US Supreme Court Rejects Case Challenging Google’s Trademark as Generic, RECORDER (Oct.
16, 2017), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/10/16/us-supreme-court-rejects-casechallenging-googles-trademark-as-generic/.
124. Id.
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